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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Navy currently deploys a centralized smart grid that consists of several 
control systems to analyze energy consumption and utilize data to drive more efficient 
operations. Being interconnected as a system-of-systems through the internet interface, 
the smart grid faces threats from the cyber realm aimed at disruption, intelligence 
gathering and destruction. In this thesis, an intrusion detection system (IDS) is 
developed for the smart grid as the first line of defense to guard against cyber attacks. We 
study the architecture of that Navy Smart Grid that utilizes Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) for control and monitor operations. We build the IDS using a 
random forest machine learning algorithm that can classify and identify malicious traffic. 
We then compare our approach to two machine learning benchmarks, namely the 
k-nearest neighbor and Bayesian learning models. We train our algorithm on an 
open-source SCADA data set that closely aligns with the type of traffic the smart grid 
would transmit. Simulations run on MATLAB show the efficacy of each of the 
algorithms and its ability to accurately classify different network threats.
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. WHAT IS A SMART GRID? ...................................................................1 
B. NAVY SMART GRID ...............................................................................2 
C. SMART GRID VULNERABILITIES .....................................................2 
D. MOTIVATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS............................................3 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION ......................................................................4 
II. RELATED WORK ................................................................................................5 
A. SCADA AND ITS RELATION TO THE NAVY SMART GRID .........5 
B. INTRODUCTION TO MODBUS ............................................................7 
C. RESEARCH ON DATASET ....................................................................9 
D. RESEARCH ON MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS ..............10 
III. MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS ........................................................13 
A. SUPERVISED LEARNING VS UNSUPERVISED LEARNING .......14 
1. Supervised Learning ....................................................................14 
2. Unsupervised Learning ...............................................................14 
B. KNN ...........................................................................................................15 
C. BAYESIAN ...............................................................................................16 
D. RANDOM FOREST ................................................................................17 
IV. RESEARCH APPROACH ..................................................................................21 
A. PROPOSED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (IDS) .................21 
B. DATASET .................................................................................................24 
1. Description of Dataset..................................................................24 
2. Feature Extraction .......................................................................26 
V. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION ............................................................27 
A. PREPARATION OF DATASETS .........................................................27 
B. EXPERIMENTS ......................................................................................28 
1. Analysis Parameters ....................................................................29 
2. Simulation Set-up .........................................................................30 
C. SIMULATION RUNS .............................................................................31 
1. Normal – Malicious ......................................................................32 
2. Normal – Exploit – Fingerprint – Malware – Unauthorize .....34 
D. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS ..................................................................39 
viii 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS .........................................................41 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ........................................................41 
B. FUTURE WORK .....................................................................................41 
1. Generate Datasets from Navy Smart Grid ................................41 
2. Using Unsupervised Machine Learning Algorithms ................42 
APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTIONS OF FLOW FEATURES FROM 
CICFLOWMETER .............................................................................................43 
APPENDIX B. CONVERSION OF PCAP FILE TO FLOW BASED CSV 
FILE USING CICFLOWMETER .....................................................................47 
APPENDIX C. USING THE MATLAB CLASSIFICATION LEARNER APP .......49 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................53 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. General Architecture of a Smart Grid Design. Source: [1]. .........................1 
Figure 2. Automation Pyramid. Source: [11]. .............................................................5 
Figure 3. General SCADA Architecture. Source: [12]. ..............................................6 
Figure 4. U.S. Navy Smart Grid Architecture. Source: [9]. ........................................7 
Figure 5. Typical Modbus/TCP Architecture. Source: [16]. .......................................9 
Figure 6. Supervised Learning versus Unsupervised Learning. Source: [23]. ..........13 
Figure 7. Illustration of the KNN Methodology. Source: [27]. .................................16 
Figure 8. Diagram of a Random Forest Classifier based on Classification 
Technique. Source: [30]. ............................................................................18 
Figure 9. Overview of Proposed IDS Architecture ...................................................21 
Figure 10. Confusion Matrix .......................................................................................29 
Figure 11. Normal-Malicious: Results from KNN Model ..........................................32 
Figure 12. Normal-Malicious: Results from Bayesian Model ....................................33 
Figure 13. Normal-Malicious Results from Random Forest Model ...........................34 
Figure 14. Results from the KNN Model for Individual Attacks ................................35 
Figure 15. Number of Observations for KNN Model .................................................35 
Figure 16. Results from Bayesian Model for Individual Attacks ................................36 
Figure 17. Number of Observations from Bayesian Model ........................................37 
Figure 18. Results from Random Forest Model for Individual Attacks ......................38 
Figure 19. Number of Observations from Random Forest Model ..............................38 
Figure 20. CICFlowmeter Program .............................................................................47 
Figure 21. Offline Conversion.....................................................................................48 
Figure 22. Locating Classification Learner App .........................................................49 
x 
Figure 23. Starting a New Session ..............................................................................49 
Figure 24. Holdout Validation at 25% ........................................................................50 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Different Versions of Modbus. Source: [15]. ..............................................8 
Table 2. Key Flow Based Features. Source: [33]. ...................................................23 
Table 3. Nominal Datasets. Source: [10]. ................................................................25 
Table 4. Malicious Datasets. Source: [10]. ..............................................................25 
Table 5. Summary of Entries for Dataset in PCAP File Format ..............................28 
Table 6. MATLAB Parameters for KNN.................................................................31 
Table 7. MATLAB Parameters for Bayesian...........................................................31 
Table 8. MATLAB Parameters for Random Forest .................................................31 
Table 9. Overall Accuracy .......................................................................................39 
Table 10. MCC Results in Malicious-Normal Scenario ............................................40 
Table 11. Descriptions of Flow Features from CICFlowMeter. Source: [36]. ..........43 
 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
C2 Command and Control 
DCS Distributed Control Systems 
DAG Directed Acyclic Graph 
DoE Department of Energy 
DoS Denial-of-Service 
FNR False Negative Rate 
FOC Full Operational Capability 
HMI Human-Man-Interface 
ICS Industrial Control System 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
IT Information Technology 
KNN K-Nearest Neighbor 
MCC Matthew Correlation Coefficient 
MTU Master Terminal Unit 
MOSAICS More Situational Awareness for Industrial Control Systems 
NAVFAC U.S. Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NextSTEP Next Systems Technology Evaluation Program 
PCA Principal Component Analysis 
PLC Programmable Logic Controller 
RTU Remote Terminal Unit 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
TPR True Positive Rate 
UDP User Datagram Protocol 
WAN Wide Area Network 
 
xiv 




First, I would like to thank my wife for taking care of our daughters in Singapore 
while allowing me to focus on my master’s degree at Naval Postgraduate School. Next, I 
would like to thank my superiors, past and present, in Republic of Singapore Air Force for 
giving me the opportunity to further my studies. I would also like to thank my advisor, 
Professor Preetha Thulasiraman, for her unwavering support and guidance along the way. 
 
xvi 




A. WHAT IS A SMART GRID? 
A commercial smart grid uses an intelligent communication network to control the 
distribution of electricity on the traditional power grid. The integration of Information 
Technology (IT) devices with the power grid enhances the reliability and efficiency of the 




The traditional power grid was built decades ago to serve a smaller community with 
a lower power requirement. Current power consumption in a typical household includes 
technology that requires large amounts of power such as charging of electrical vehicles. In 
Figure 1, the general architecture of the commercial smart grid is shown.  
The advantages of the smart grid as summarized by the U.S. Department of Energy 
are as follow: 
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• More efficient transmission of electricity. 
• Quicker restoration of electricity after power disturbances. 
• Reduced operations and management costs for utilities, and ultimately 
lower power costs for consumers. 
• Reduced peak demand, which will also help lower electricity rates. 
• Increased integration of large-scale renewable energy systems. 
• Better integration of customer-owner power generation systems, 
including renewable energy systems. 
• Improved security. [2] 
At the heart of the smart grid is the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI). The 
AMI is a two-way transmission system that combines smart meters and communication 
networks. It enables communication between utility companies and consumers. A smart 
meter is an electronic device that collects data on energy consumption, including voltage 
levels, current and other power factors.  
B. NAVY SMART GRID 
In 2013, the U.S. Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC) 
developed the operational requirements to implement its own smart grid [3]. In 2019, 
NAVFAC deployed the Navy Smart Grid enterprise energy management solution. It was 
highlighted in the press release that “with Smart Grid, an operator in a central command 
location can monitor energy data in near-real time, deploying technicians to efficiently 
manage emergencies, outages, and repairs” [4]. NAVFAC has achieved Full Operational 
Capability (FOC) of the smart grid at several locations in the mid-Atlantic states. 
Like the commercial smart grid, the Navy smart grid relies on the AMI and its smart 
meters to monitor and control energy consumption remotely. Information flows from smart 
meters to the Command and Control (C2) center are transmitted via a Wide Area Network 
(WAN). This results in a reduction of operational and maintenance costs.  
C. SMART GRID VULNERABILITIES 
Although the smart grid has benefitted both the suppliers and consumers, the 
introduction of network communication has created weaknesses in the system. The 
addition of network communication, wireless or wired, exposes the smart grid to a series 
of cyberattacks with several entry points [5].  
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One such prominent cyberattack is Stuxnet. Stuxnet [6] is a large, complex piece 
of malware that was written to target an industrial control system (ICS) or similar systems 
such as the smart grid. In this era of post-Stuxnet, systems such as the smart grid are not 
able to be air-gapped and secured fully. Furthermore, Raj Samani from Cloud Security 
Alliance [7] stated that a group of academics discovered various code vulnerabilities on 
smart meter platforms, allowing them to take entire control of the smart meter system. This 
could result in a power spike or a partial or complete smart grid outage. 
D. MOTIVATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
For the Navy to ensure resiliency of the smart grid network, effective 
countermeasures against security threats must be addressed using techniques that adapt to 
the massive data that is collected by smart sensors and meters. The goal of our research is 
to develop cost-effective, cyber threat detection techniques to secure energy infrastructure 
that is critical to the Navy. Our research is focused on the use of cyber analytics to 
continually define and mitigate evolving threat vectors for the Navy Smart Grid. 
Traditionally, cyber security is managed with reactive solutions that respond to incidents 
once they have occurred. Cyber analytics is a proactive method to cyber protection that 
anticipates future attack strategies and incorporates information into the real-time response 
management of ongoing attacks. Machine learning and statistical data analysis are key to 
developing cyber analytic tools that will allow the accurate classification/identification of 
adversarial and malicious network activity.  
In recent years, NAVFAC has invested in threat detection methodologies, including 
in the Department of Energy (DoE) More Situational Awareness for Industrial Control 
Systems (MOSAICS) project. While the objective of MOSAICS is attack mitigation on 
general critical infrastructure control systems within DOD, the research presented in this 
thesis is focused on security of the network communications of the Navy smart grid using 
machine learning processes. The research in this thesis contributes to a project funded by 
the Office of Naval Research called Next Systems Technology Evaluation Program 
(NextSTEP) which is studying the security of the Navy smart grid. 
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The work presented in this thesis is built upon two previous research efforts by 
former NPS MSEE students: First, Vincent Chan proposed a K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) 
supervised machine learning algorithm to develop a simple intrusion detection system 
(IDS) for the Navy smart grid. He trained his algorithm with the CICIDS2017 dataset [8]. 
Second, Carolyn Schiesser proposed a Bayesian classification algorithm for network threat 
detection. She trained her algorithm with Lemay and Fernandez’s dataset from the 
University of Montreal [9]. 
In this thesis, we improve upon the research by these authors by increasing smart 
grid threat classification accuracy via the use of Random Forest machine learning 
algorithm. We use Lemay and Fernandez’s dataset [10] to train our algorithm and compare 
against the KNN and Bayesian approaches.  
The contributions of this thesis are: 
1. Design of an IDS architecture for the Navy smart grid. The IDS is 
comprised of the following components: Network Data Collection, Flow 
Generation, Feature Construction, Classification Training, and Detection 
through Machine Learning. 
2. Evaluation and comparison of KNN, Bayesian and Random Forest 
algorithm on Lemay and Fernandez’s datasets. 
3. Validation via MATLAB that the Random Forest algorithm is a more 
efficient approach based on performances shown on true positive rates, 
Matthew Correlation Coefficient (MCC) values and overall accuracy.  
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter II, we provide a 
thorough literature review on the dataset and machine learning algorithm to be implemented 
on the IDS. In Chapter III, we cover the theory behind the various machine learning algorithms 
used in this thesis. In Chapter IV, we propose the IDS architecture and discuss in detail the 
chosen dataset and Random Forest algorithm. In Chapter V, we describe and analyze our 
results. Lastly, Chapter VI provides the conclusion and recommendations for future work. 
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II. RELATED WORK 
A. SCADA AND ITS RELATION TO THE NAVY SMART GRID 
The definition of an ICS, as described by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), is an overall term that incorporates different control systems, such as 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems 
(DCS), and other control system configurations [5].  
To understand the different layers of automation that can exist in an ICS, the 
automation pyramid was developed to guide companies in managing their system-of-
systems. An automation pyramid classifies the different IT layers of automated productions 
plants. An example of an automation pyramid is shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
The automation pyramid categorizes each level in accordance with their individual 
purpose or function. SCADA systems are commonly located at level two, also known as 
the middle layer. SCADA allows electronic automation components to communicate even 
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if geographically dispersed. A basic SCADA system consists of a control center and a few 
field sites that are connected via a Wide Area Network (WAN).  
Communications between the devices usually occurs through constant polling and 
by the use of network protocols such as ModBus. The control server records information 
gathered from the field sites and thereafter sends information to the Human-Man-Interface 
(HMI) display for the operator to analyze. The control center carries out integrated 
alarming, trending evaluation and reporting. The field site, adopted from level zero and 
level one of the Automation Pyramid, plays the role of controlling actuators and monitoring 
sensors. Figure 3 depicts a general SCADA architecture.  
 
 
SCADA is a central component of the Navy smart grid. An overview of the Navy 
smart grid is shown in Figure 4. Comparing Figure 3 and Figure 4, we can draw similarity 
in terms of the system architecture. Both architectures are composed of smart meters and 
controllers that are constantly communicating with the control server. The blue lines shown 
in Figure 4 reflect the communication path between the smart meters and controllers with 





B. INTRODUCTION TO MODBUS 
As mentioned in the previous section, the U.S. Navy smart grid uses Modbus to 
communicate between servers and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC). Previously 
known as Modicon and created in 1979 by Schneider-Electric, Modbus is a serial 
communication protocol between Remote Terminal Units (RTU) and PLCs [13]. Since 
then, many industrial companies have used this communication protocol as the default [14]. 
Modbus has many different versions. The commonly used ones are listed in Table 1.  
  
8 
Table 1. Different Versions of Modbus. Source: [15]. 
 
 
In Modbus/TCP, the data is encapsulated in a TCP/IP packet and transmitted within 
the Ethernet frame. A majority of the Modbus/TCP messages include commands on 
reading and writing registers and coils. In a traditional control system, coils are referred to 
as one-bit registers while multi-bit registers are named as registers. In a default Modbus 
serial communication, the master controls the Modbus data transactions with multiple 
slaves that respond to the  requests of the master to read from or write data to the slaves 
[16]. The significant difference between a default Modbus communication to Modbus/TCP 
is that Modbus/TCP uses a client/server architecture through Ethernet. A typical Modbus 
TCP architecture that is comprised of serial Modbus communication and Modbus/TCP 




C. RESEARCH ON DATASET 
For optimum and accurate analysis, a dataset generated from the Navy smart grid 
would be of significant benefit. However, due to the classified nature of the Navy smart 
grid dataset, we were unable to utilize it for this work. Therefore, we researched suitable 
SCADA datasets that were available as open-source documents. 
Teixeira et al. developed a SCADA system testbed that consists of a water storage 
tank control system for water treatment and distribution [17]. The dataset was collected by 
software such as Wireshark to capture the PCAP file. The authors also carried out five 
different type of reconnaissance attacks on their testbed. However, the datasets lack a 
variety of different type of attacks as only reconnaissance attacks are present in the datasets.  
Rosa et al. developed a SCADA system testbed in a hybrid environment which 
consists of real network communication and SCADA assets that emulated a power grid 
[18]. By assessment, this dataset consists of the most comprehensive types of attack. 
Furthermore, it is based on the power grid testbed architecture, which is very similar to the 
Navy smart grid. However, this dataset is not shared in the open-source internet for 
analysis. 
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In this thesis, we use Lemay and Fernandez’s data set developed at the University 
of Montreal [10]. Lemay et al. produced a dataset based on the construction of a traffic 
simulation environment where Modbus/TCP tools and a sandbox are used to introduce 
realism into the physical components. The similarities between the Navy smart grid and 
Lemay’s sandbox are due to their origin in the automation pyramid shown in Figure 2 and 
the Modbus protocol used between the layer 2 and layer 1 components. A wide variety of 
attacks are carried out on the testbed. This data set is comprehensive and provides enough 
similarity to the Navy smart grid for use in this thesis. We provide further detail on the data 
set in Chapter IV. 
D. RESEARCH ON MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS 
Teixeira et al. highlighted that there are a few malicious attacks which are harder 
to detect [17]. The authors added that some of the attacks can be used to map the network, 
making the attack traffic look like regular behavior. Therefore, the use of rule-based 
mechanisms such as anti-virus software will not be successful in detecting these attacks as 
the signature of the Modbus network remains unchanged. Therefore, the authors suggested 
the application of machine learning algorithms to identify attacks that can be easily hidden 
when using conventional approaches. 
In this thesis, we chose to use the Random Forest machine learning algorithm. 
Angelo and Drummond highlighted a few advantages of Random Forest over other 
machine learning algorithms when it comes to implementing an IDS. They are 
1. Low training time complexity, O(nlog(n)) and fast prediction. 
2. Resilience to deal with imbalanced datasets. 
3. Embedded feature selection method and intrinsic metrics to rank 
features by importance. 
4. Able to deal natively with categorical and continuous features. [19] 
Chauhan et al. [20] conducted experiments to find the best performing machine 
learning classification technique that is most suitable for IDS. They used the NSL-KDD 
dataset. A total of ten machine learning algorithms were tested and evaluated. The results 
showed that decision tree classifiers tend to perform better than others at classifying 
11 
network intrusions. Amongst the list of decision tree classifiers, Random Forest 
outperformed the rest with respect to accuracy, specificity and sensitivity. 
Belavagi et al. [21] evaluated four supervised machine learning classifiers for an  
IDS. Similarly, the authors used the NSL-KDD dataset for their research. The four 
classifiers are namely:  Support Vector Machine, Random Forest, Logistic Regression and 
Gaussian Naïve Bayes. Standard performance-based indicators such as precision, recall, 
F1-Score and accuracy were compared among the four algorithms. With a 99% accuracy, 
the authors concluded that the Random Forest classifier surpasses the other classifiers. 
Ashraf et al. [22] experimented with three supervised machine learning algorithms 
and used the NSL-KDD dataset on their proposed IDS. Naïve Bayes, J48 and Random 
Forest machine learning algorithms were used. Outputs such as precision, recall and F-
measure were recorded and compared amongst the three algorithms. In terms of both 
accuracy and detection rate, the authors concluded that Random Forest outperformed Naïve 
Bayes and J48. 
  
12 
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III. MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS 
There are two types of machine learning algorithms: supervised learning and 
unsupervised learning. We provide a short summary of both groups in this section. We go 
through the supervised learning algorithms KNN, Bayesian, and Random Forest in depth 
because they are the foundation for the research given in this thesis. Figure 6 shows 




A. SUPERVISED LEARNING VS UNSUPERVISED LEARNING 
1. Supervised Learning 
In supervised learning, the algorithm requires a dataset that needs to be trained on 
labelled data that consists of normal traffic and anomalous traffic. This dataset usually 
requires human intervention to determine the labelling of the data. Depending on how the 
datasets are generated, the dataset can consist of all anomaly scenarios combined as a single 
or different class. For example, in IDS, the anomaly data can be either labeled as 
“malicious” or according to the respective type of attacks such as Denial-of-Service (DOS). 
Next, the training and testing datasets must be chosen for cross validation. In this method, 
the training dataset will be modeled and thereafter evaluation on the model is carried out 
on the testing dataset. In supervised learning, there are two techniques currently being 
modeled. They are:  
• Classification: This technique predicts categorical responses. For example, 
whether the network data from a certain IP address is malicious or normal. 
Classification models categorize response data into categories. Algorithms 
such as KNN and Naïve Bayes are classification techniques.  
• Regression. This technique predicts continuous responses. For example, 
whether the traffic data is transmitting in small packets or large packets 
over a period of time. In this way, the regression models can classify large 
packets of certain range to be malicious. On such example of regression 
technique is Ensemble Method. 
2. Unsupervised Learning 
In unsupervised learning, the algorithm does not require labelled data, and is 
therefore applicable to most applications. This method discovers hidden patterns or data 
groupings without the need for human intervention [24]. In the dataset required for 
unsupervised learning, normal data instances will be far more common than anomalous 
ones. Otherwise, the algorithm will face a high false alarm rate. Compared to supervised 
learning, there are three techniques used in unsupervised learning: clustering, association, 
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and dimensionality reduction. Of the three mentioned, clustering technique is the most 
commonly used by researchers.  
B. KNN 
As discussed in Chapter I, we use the KNN algorithm as one of our benchmarks to 
test against our Random Forest based IDS. The KNN algorithm, developed by Thomas 
Cover et al. in 1966, is one of the simplest and oldest algorithms for pattern categorization 
[25]. The rule categorizes every unlabeled data in the training set according to the majority 
label among k-nearest neighbors. The KNN performance usually hinge on the distance 
metric, “k” in identifying its nearest neighbors. Without any knowledge on the distribution, 
KNN uses Euclidean metric to quantify the differences between each sampled data. 
Euclidean distance is described as follows: 
  (4.1) 
where we define vector 𝑥 = (𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3, … , 𝑎𝑛) , where n denotes the vector input’s 
dimensionality, or the number of sample characteristics. 𝑎𝑟 is the example’s rth 
characteristics while 𝑤𝑟 is the weight of the rth characteristics. r ranges from 1 to n [26]. 
This means that the smaller the Euclidean distance, 𝑑(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) between any two examples, 
the similarity between them rises. 
A test example’s class label is determined by a majority poll of its k nearest 
neighbors as shown below in equation 4.2 [26].  
  (4.2) 
In the above formula, 𝑑𝑖 is a test example while 𝑥𝑗 refers to its k nearest neighbors 
based on a training dataset, and𝑦(𝑥𝑗 , 𝑐𝑘) signifies if 𝑥𝑗belongs to class 𝑐𝑘. Equation 4.2 
estimates the class having many of the members in the k nearest neighbors. Figure 7 
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illustrates the KNN methodology. From Figure 7, we can see that if k = 3 (from the inner 
circumference), it will be assigned with class B, respectively, if k = 6 (from the outer 
circumference), it will be assigned with class A.  
 
 
While KNN is widely used due to its simplicity and its ease of application, the 
algorithm may sometimes fail to achieve good accuracy due to the uneven allocation of the 
examples among classes. Trial and error on getting the best k value are required to achieve 
the best result. This is not ideal as such a method is time consuming to train. More so, large 
datasets that are generated from a SCADA network will add significantly to the training 
time. 
C. BAYESIAN 
The second benchmark used in this thesis is the Bayesian learning method which 
was used as part of a former thesis [9]. The Bayesian algorithm is another classification 
technique that is widely used. The Bayesian algorithm is built upon two components: “A 
graphical component, also known as a directed acyclic graph (DAG), where the vertices 
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represent events, and the edges are relations between events, and a numerical component 
that quantifies different links in the DAG by a conditional probability distribution of each 
parent node” [28]. 
Naïve Bayes comprises DAGs of a parent node with several child nodes where the 
child nodes are independent of one another. The categorization is guaranteed by 
deliberating the parent node as a concealed parameter that specifies which class each item 
in the dataset should be allocated to, and the child nodes as various properties that define 
this object [28]. Naïve Bayes was chosen in [9] due to the same advantages it had as 
compared to KNN. Furthermore, Naïve Bayes is more effective than KNN because it can 
determine the likelihood of a future occurrence centered on the knowledge of prior 
conditional and marginal probabilities [9]. The Bayesian rule is expressed as such: 
    (4.3) 
where in the session class, E denotes the sum of evidence on attribute nodes and s_i 
represent a potential value. The sum of evidence E are dispersed into individual parts., say 
e1, e2, ..., e𝑛  with relation to E1, E2, ..., E𝑛, respectively [30]. Since these attributes are 
independent of one another, the combined probability is achieved as such in Equation 4.4.  
                                             (4.4) 
D. RANDOM FOREST 
Random Forest is an “ensemble of unpruned classification or regression trees 
usually trained with the ‘bagging’ method” [29]. The key features of Random Forest are 
mentioned in Chapter II. In particular, the main benefit of using this method as compared 
to the previous two algorithms is its versatility in utilizing both regression and classification 




The algorithm produces various classification trees constructed from decision tree 
algorithms. A decision tree consists of a root node at the top layer, decision nodes at the 
subsequent layers and leaf nodes at the last layer where the leaf node is the final output 
generated. Each tree is comprised of a data sample taken from a training set, called the 
bootstrap sample. From the data sample, usually thirty percent of it is set aside to test the 
algorithm. This is also known as the out-of-bag sample. Next, randomness is induced 
through feature bagging to reduce the correlation among all the classification trees. As 
mentioned, Random Forest utilizes both regression and classification techniques. In a 
classification technique, a majority vote based on the most frequent categorical variable of 
the classification trees will be the final prediction for the algorithm. Figure 8 depicts a 
simplified Random Forest classifier based on the classification technique. For regression, 
the individual decision tree is averaged to output the final prediction. Finally, the out-of-
bag sample is then applied for cross-validation to conclude the prediction.  
All machine learning algorithms require the tuning of several parameters to achieve 
its highest effectiveness. For the Random Forest, there are three factors to fine tune the 
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accuracy of the algorithm: 1) the number of classification trees, 2) the number of nodes, 
and 3) the number of features sampled. 
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IV. RESEARCH APPROACH 
A. PROPOSED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (IDS) 
In this chapter, we propose our approach to detect and sense network intrusions in 
a SCADA network using supervised machine learning. Our approach is built upon the 
assumption that malicious intent against a SCADA network, especially on Modbus/TCP, 
will trigger considerable variation from normal network data. As such, we use the Random 
Forest machine learning algorithm to analyze traffic patterns, detect network anomalies 
and alert the network user when such threats arise. 
An overview of the proposed IDS architecture is shown in Figure 9. The proposed 
approach is segmented into five portions. 
 
 
The first step of our IDS architecture is Network Data Collection. This process is 
responsible for collecting and capturing the Modbus/TCP data. Modbus/TCP is the 
connection-oriented version of traditional Modbus [31]. While there are other SCADA 
protocols such as Profibus, DNP3 and IEC-61850, our thesis is centered only on the 
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The Modbus/TCP data are translated into PCAP format. Basically, a PCAP file 
format comprises of (1) a number to identify the packet in sequence, (2) timestamp of each 
network packets, (3) the source IP address, (4) the source port, (5) the destination IP 
address, (6) the destination port, (7) the network protocol and (8) the length of the packet. 
Besides these eight fields, the last field, which is the information field, contains the polling 
and controlling information of the Modbus devices. 
The second step of our architecture is denoted as Flow Generation. This is where 
the packet data extracted in the first step is used to cluster the packets into IP flows using 
an open-sourced software called CICFlowMeter. The CICFlowMeter is used on many 
datasets. The creator of this tool mentioned that “it can be used to generate bidirectional 
flows, where the first packet determines the forward (source to destination) and backward 
(destination to source) directions, hence more than 80 statistical network traffic features 
such as Duration, Number of packets, Number of bytes, Length of packets, etc., can be 
calculated separately in the forward and backward directions. Additional functionalities 
include, selecting features from the list of existing features, adding new features, and 
controlling the duration of flow timeout. The output of the application is the CSV format 
file that has six columns labeled for each flow (FlowID, SourceIP, DestinationIP, 
SourcePort, DestinationPort, and Protocol) with more than 80 network traffic analysis 
features” [32]. The advantage of having Flow Generation in the IDS is that it is able to 
provide an outline of the network performance by displaying the key indicators of the 
interfaces among the network nodes, which can disclose abnormalities from the routine 
behavior caused by malicious data.  
The next step after Flow Generation is to construct relevant features, called Feature 
Construction. In this process, features are extracted from the IP flows and data instances 
are generated. One of the key features of the traffic in SCADA is that it is very well 
recognized, displaying noticeable patterns in the transmission among devices. This implies 
that the polling connections between the masters, Master Terminal Units (MTU), and 
slaves, Remote Terminal Units (RTU), adhere to a predictable schedule. Further, the 
network packets that communicate in SCADA typically have similar ranges. Centered on 
these characteristics, we deem that some of the key IP flow features such as average packet 
23 
size, source port numbers, destination port numbers and packets per second may suggest 
that the network packet is malicious. The key features used in this thesis are as shown in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Key Flow Based Features. Source: [33]. 
 
 
In the Classification Training process, a set of data instances which consist of 
malicious or normal traffic generated from the previous Flow Generator is fed to the input 
of the machine learning algorithm to train and classify the data into malicious or normal 
traffic. This training process is an iterative method to ensure that the model is always up to 
date to detect new malicious data. 
In the last phase, Detection through Machine Learning, the machine learning 
algorithm trained in the previous stage is used to detect the data instances as malicious and 
inform the administrator for the next course of action.  
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B. DATASET 
1. Description of Dataset 
Lemay et al. simulated a lab environment which comprised of several MTUs and 
RTUs connected within a local network [10]. The controllers manage a simulated physical 
system that is power up by a 12kV power source. The data sets include regular polling as 
well as physical operation to emulate the real environment of a SCADA system. In their 
dataset collection experiment, different types of data have been collected through the 
injection of different malicious attacks. Specifically, new penetration assessment tools such 
as Metasploit are injected into the system [15]. 
In terms of the weakness or rather drawbacks of this dataset, it does not incorporate 
a wide group of Modbus-based attacks. According to Morris and Gao, “there are several 
different groups of Modbus-based attacks” [15], [36]. All these attacks are not injected into 
the dataset that we are training. Instead, malicious data commonly tested for home and 
office-based networks are used in this dataset. What this means is that this dataset does not 
simulate a wider variety of attacks that could be used on SCADA network. On the other 
hand, the benefit that one can reap from this dataset is that it imitates the timing behavior 
and the rate of packets per duration, which could be an excellent feature for detecting 
malicious data. 
In the dataset used, eleven sub-datasets are produced which contain six nominal 
data sets and five malicious data sets. Table 3 shows the description of the six nominal data 
sets, and Table 4 shows the description of the five malicious data sets. 
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Table 3. Nominal Datasets. Source: [10]. 





1 hour of regular Modbus traffic including polling 
and manual operation - 2 MTU, 3 RTU and 10 
seconds polling interval 
No 72186 
Run 11 
1 hour of regular Modbus traffic including polling 
and manual operation - 2 MTU, 3 RTU and 10 
seconds polling interval 
No 72498 
Run1_6RTU 
1 hour of regular Modbus traffic including polling 
and manual operation - 2 MTU, 6 RTU and 10 
seconds polling interval 
No 134690 
Run_12RTU 
1 hour of regular Modbus traffic including polling 
and manual operation - 2 MTU, 12 RTU and 10 
seconds polling interval 
No 238260 
Run1_3RTU_2s 
1 hour of regular Modbus traffic including polling 
and manual operation - 2 MTU, 3 RTU and 2 
seconds polling interval 
No 305932 
Modbus_polling_only_6RTU 
1 hour of regular Modbus traffic including polling 
only - 1 MTU, 3 RTU and 10 seconds polling 
interval 
No 58325 
Table 4. Malicious Datasets. Source: [10]. 






3 minutes of regular Modbus traffic including 





11 minutes of regular Modbus traffic including 
polling and manual operation - 1 MTU, 6 RTU and 
10 seconds polling interval.                                                  
Also includes sending a Modbus write operation 
from a compromised RTU using Metasploit proxy 




5.5 minutes of regular Modbus traffic including 
polling and manual operation - 1 MTU, 6 RTU and 
10 seconds polling interval Also includes sending a 
series of modbus read commands to characterize 




1 minute of regular Modbus traffic including 
polling and manual operation - 1 MTU, 6 RTU and 
10 seconds polling interval. Also includes sending 
an EXE file from a compromised RTU to another 




5 minutes of regular Modbus traffic including 
polling and manual operation - 1 MTU, 6 RTU and 
10 seconds polling interval. Also includes using an 
Yes 1856 
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exploit (ms08_netapi) from a compromised RTU to 
compromise another RTU using Metasploit 
 
2. Feature Extraction 
In supervised learning, Anton et al. highlighted that one of the crucial steps before 
detecting an anomaly is the need to select relevant features or data required for training 
[15]. These characteristics are important as they represent data instances related to a certain 
objective in identifying occurrences that deviate significantly from the norm. Therefore, 
extracting such features are required to define the general behavior of the system before 
training them on the machine learning algorithm. 
Many researchers studying datasets for IDS implementation have determined the 
critical features required to train their respective machine learning algorithm. Anton et al. 
proposed a list of 14 features in the Lemay and Fernandez dataset to train their machine 
learning algorithm. These features are obtained from the Ethernet header, TCP/IP header, 
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) headers and the capturing tool [15].  
Relevant feature extraction in large data sets requires a massive amount of effort. 
While it is possible to code a program to evaluate and remove features that have little or 
negligible impact on the resultant model, it is time exhausting and therefore not 
economical. In our work, we are using the CICFlowMeter to extract at least 83 flow 
features from the Lemay and Fernandez dataset. See Appendix A for the description of the 
83 flow features extracted from CICFlowMeter. 
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V. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION 
To implement our IDS, the MATLAB Classification Learner App is used to train 
and test KNN, Bayesian and Random Forest algorithm with the datasets provided by 
Lemay and Fernandez, highlighted in Tables 3 and 4 of Chapter IV. Prior to training and 
testing, the datasets were input to the CICFlowmeter to generate features. This chapter 
discusses the results that were obtained using these three algorithms. 
A. PREPARATION OF DATASETS 
In the malicious datasets, there were a total of four different types of attack. They 
are as follows: 
1. Remote exploit by using a compromised machine to compromise a 
controller. Henceforth labelled as “Exploit” in the datasets. 
2. Uploading of Malware. Henceforth labelled as “Malware” in the datasets. 
3. Fingerprinting attack by sending of read packets to controller to gather 
information. Henceforth labelled as “Fingerprint” in the datasets. 
4. Sending of unauthorized command to controller. Henceforth labelled as 
“Unauthorized” in the datasets. 
While all the attacks mentioned in Table 4 of Chapter IV were part of the five 
malicious datasets, there was a mixture of normal traffic with malicious traffic. Table 5 
shows a summary of the entries for each dataset in their PCAP file format that is provided 
by Lemay and Fernandez. There is a total of 27,432 normal entries and a total combined 
number of 2,631 malicious entries. The ratio of malicious to normal entries is about 1:10. 
These combined entries will serve its intended purpose to train and test the three machine 





Table 5. Summary of Entries for Dataset in PCAP File Format 
Files Name 
Number of Entries 











11156  10   11166 
Characterization_Modb
us_6RTU_ with_operate 




1305  121   1426 
6RTU_with_operate 657 1199    1856 
 
From the PCAP files, there are very few features to train the algorithm. As such, 
there is a need to convert the PCAP file into a flow format CSV file where over eighty-
three features can be captured for effective training. As mentioned in Chapter II, 
CICFlowmeter is used to convert the PCAP file into an IP flow format to display the key 
indicators of the interfaces among the network nodes, which can disclose abnormalities 
from the routine behavior caused by malicious data. 
The Appendix B lays out how to set up and use the CICFlowmeter to convert the 
PCAP file into an IP flow format in CSV file. The final CSV file consists of a total of 3,186 
entries. Out of this total, there are 3,162 normal entries and 24 malicious entries. The ratio 
of malicious to normal entries is about 1:132. 
B. EXPERIMENTS 
A confusion matrix shown in Figure 10 is normally referenced to visualize the 
results in a classification problem. This tool is used in the analysis of the experiments in 
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this section. A true positive means that the actual malicious packet is correctly predicted 
as malicious while a false positive means that the actual malicious packet is incorrectly 
predicted as a normal packet. A true negative means that the actual normal packet is 
correctly predicted as normal while a false negative means that the actual normal packet is 



















1. Analysis Parameters 
To determine and compare the effectiveness and efficiency of the three machine 
learning algorithms, we consider the following measures: 
1. Overall Accuracy: The overall accuracy is the proportion of correct 
predictions made to the size of the dataset. However, the overall accuracy 
parameter is highly unreliable in classification applications for unbalanced 
datasets, as is the case in our experiments where the proportion of 
malicious to normal traffic is 1/132. It is included here for reference only, 
and we will complement this measure with better suited ones for 
unbalanced datasets scenarios.  
2. True Positive Rate: The rate in which an occasion is correctly determined 
as an intrusion or normal packet. This parameter is indicated as TPR in the 
confusion matrix results. 
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3. False Negative Rate: The rate in which an occasion is incorrectly 
determine as an intrusion or normal packet. This parameter is indicated as 
FNR in the confusion matrix results.  
4. Matthew Correlation Coefficient (MCC): It is defined as “the 
measurement of the quality of binary classifications that considers true and 
false positives and negatives” [35]. MCC is a correlation coefficient 
among the actual and predicted binary and will return a value between -1 
to 1. The higher the value of the MCC, the better prediction is on the 
algorithm itself. Due to the unbalance datasets used in this experiment, we 
use MCC as it is a more balanced measurement compared to overall 
accuracy. The MCC is calculated in Equation 5.1. 
               (5.1) 
 
where TP, TN, FP, and FN are defined as the number of true positives, true negatives, false 
positives and false negatives, respectively [38]. 
2. Simulation Set-up 
Appendix C lays out how to set up and use the MATLAB Classification Learner 
application to carry out the tests. The general parameters for KNN, Bayesian and Random 
Forest are listed in Tables 6, 7 and 8, respectively. Five-fold cross-validation is used in our 
implementations. In such scenario the dataset is split into five subsets of equal size, and 
the classifier is successfully trained on four of the sets and tested on the fifth subset. The 
classification-testing process is repeated five times and overall classification performance 
obtained by averaging the performance over the five testing subsets. As mentioned in 
Chapter IV, there were only 24 malicious entries out of a total of 3186 entries. PCA was 
disabled as simulations showed no difference in results between PCA enabled and PCA 
disabled.  
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Table 6. MATLAB Parameters for KNN 
Model Type Weighted KNN 
Validation 5 folds cross-validation 
Number of neighbors 10 
Distance Metric Euclidean 
Distance Weight Inverse 
Standardize Data True 
PCA Disabled 
Table 7. MATLAB Parameters for Bayesian 
Model Type Kernel Naïve Bayes 
Validation 5 folds cross-validation 
Kernel Type Gaussian 
Support Unbounded 
PCA Disabled 
Table 8. MATLAB Parameters for Random Forest 
Model Type Bagged Trees 
Validation 5 folds cross-validation 
Ensemble Bagged 
Learner Type Decision Tree 
Number of learners 30 
PCA Disabled 
 
C. SIMULATION RUNS 
There were two types of simulation runs carried out on the three machine learning 
algorithms. The first type of simulation requires the algorithm to learn based on two types 
of outputs labelled namely normal and malicious traffic. This is to ensure that all types of 
attack can be discerned from the normal traffic. The second type of simulation requires the 
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algorithm to learn based on the four different types of attack with normal traffic. This is to 
ensure that the algorithm can discern the specific type of attack from all traffic. A total of 
5 runs were carried out on each algorithm to get the average result. 
1. Normal – Malicious 
Figure 11 shows that the attack traffic can be distinguished from normal traffic with 
a probability of 99.53% of overall accuracy based on the KNN model. All 5 runs showed 
50% of the 24 malicious entries (12 out of 24 entries) classified incorrectly as normal traffic 
while 0.1% of the normal entries were incorrectly classified as malicious traffic (3 out of 
3162 entries). The number of true positives, true negatives, false positives and false 
negatives are 12, 3159, 12 and 3 respectively. Substituting these values into equation 5.1, 
leads to a MCC value of 0.63. We include the MCC value as it provides a better 
representation of the capability of the algorithm to discriminate between normal and 
malicious data than the accuracy level does in the unbalanced dataset environments 




Figure 12 shows that the attack traffic can be distinguished from normal traffic with 
a probability of 99.37% of overall accuracy based on a Bayesian model. All 5 runs show 
that 66.7% of the 24 malicious entries (16 out of 24 entries) were classified incorrectly as 
normal traffic while 0.1% of the normal entries were incorrectly classified as malicious 
traffic (4 out of 3162 entries). The number of true positives, true negatives, false positives 
and false negatives are 8, 3158, 16 and 4, respectively. Substituting these values into 
equation 5.1, leads to a MCC value of 0.47. 
 
 
Figure 13 shows that the attack traffic can be distinguished from normal traffic with 
a probability of 99.69% of overall accuracy based on the Random Forest model. This model 
achieved the highest overall accuracy amongst the three models tested. All 5 runs showed 
29.2% of the 24 malicious entries (7 out of 24 entries) classified incorrectly as normal 
traffic while 0.1% of the normal entries were incorrectly classified as malicious traffic (3 
out of 3162 entries). The number of true positives, true negatives, false positives and false 
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negatives are 17, 3159, 7 and 3, respectively. Substituting these values into Equation 5.1, 
leads to a MCC value of 0.77.  
Thus, based on MCC values obtained, results showed the random forest classifier 
is better able to discriminate between normal and malicious data than the other two 
classifiers investigated in the study.  
 
 
2. Normal – Exploit – Fingerprint – Malware – Unauthorize 
Figure 14 shows that the traffic can be distinguished correctly with a probability of 
99.47% of overall accuracy based on the KNN model in all 5 runs. Figure 15 shows the 
number of observations for KNN Model. All the entries from “Malware” and 







Figure 16 shows that the traffic can be distinguished correctly with a probability of 
95.95% of overall accuracy based on the Bayesian model. Figure 17 shows the number of 






Figure 18 shows that the attack traffic can be distinguished from normal traffic with 
a probability of 99.53% of overall accuracy based on Random Forest model. Figure 19 







D. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
In Table 9, we show the overall accuracy for the simulation runs for the three 
machine learning algorithms. The results show that Random Forest performs the best when 
it comes to detecting either malicious or normal traffic with an overall accuracy of 99.69%. 
When it comes to detecting the normal traffic with different types of malicious traffic, 
Random Forest also performs the best but slightly better than KNN with an overall 
accuracy of 99.53%. 










– Malware – 
Unauthorize 
99.53% 99.47% 95.95% 
 
However, as explained in the earlier chapter, the ratio of malicious to normal entries 
is 1:132. As a result, the overall accuracy rate may not be a reliable parameter for such an 
unbalanced dataset as it does not accurately represent how malicious packets are classified. 
Thus, we also considered additional measures such as (1) the true positive rate defined as 
the ratio of malicious events detected as malicious over the total number of malicious 
events and (2) the Matthew correlation coefficient (MCC) to provide additional insight in 
the classifier performances. Simulations showed the KNN, Bayesian and Random Forest 
classifiers have true positive rates (also referred to as sensitivity or recall) of 50%, 33.3% 
and 70.8% respectively. Table 10 lists the MCC values obtained for the three models in the 
malicious-normal scenario. Results based on MCC values indicate that the random forest 
implementation performs better than the other two classifiers considered in our study.  
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MCC 0.77 0.63 0.47 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Navy cybersecurity defenses must stay resilient while retaining its technical 
edge. By deploying its smart grid, the Navy aims to increase the dependability and 
efficiency of its energy supply. Once placed on a network, the Navy smart grid 
infrastructure can be exposed to cyber attacks by both state and non-state actors.  
Our objective in this thesis was to build an IDS using the Random Forest machine 
learning algorithm. We then compared our approach to that of previous NPS research that 
used KNN and Bayesian learning models to detect and classify anomalous traffic and 
incidents. In this thesis, we have completed the following work: 
1. Designed an IDS architecture for the Navy smart grid that is comprised of
the following components: Network Data Collection, Flow Generation,
Feature Construction, Classification Training, and Detection through
Machine Learning.
2. Compared KNN, Bayesian and Random Forest algorithm on Lemay and
Fernandez’s datasets and average the result of each model by running 5
times.
3. Validated via MATLAB that the Random Forest algorithm is a more
efficient approach based on performances shown on true positive rates,
MCC values and overall accuracy.
B. FUTURE WORK
1. Generate Datasets from Navy Smart Grid
Due to the classification of dataset from the Navy smart grid, we were not able to 
use the classified dataset from the Navy smart grid. In this thesis, we used an alternative 
dataset that is publicly available to run our simulations. However, such publicly available 
dataset generated from the SCADA sandbox is not able to closely mimic the Navy smart 
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grid. An actual dataset generated from the Navy smart grid that can be used to train specific 
machine learning algorithms will be of practical benefit. 
2. Using Unsupervised Machine Learning Algorithms 
Unsupervised machine learning discovers patterns in a data set before classifying 
them as features or classification groups with the least amount of human intervention. This 
would allow the machine learning algorithm to recognize a larger number of characteristics 
while also categorizing new data as network traffic moves and grows. 
43 
APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTIONS OF FLOW FEATURES FROM 
CICFLOWMETER 
The following table describes the flow features extracted from the CICFlowMeter. 
Table 11. Descriptions of Flow Features from CICFlowMeter. Source: [36]. 
Feature Name Description 
Flow duration Duration of the flow in Microsecond 
total Fwd Packet Total packets in the forward direction 
total Bwd packets Total packets in the backward direction 
total Length of Fwd Packet Total size of packet in forward direction 
total Length of Bwd Packet Total size of packet in backward direction 
Fwd Packet Length Min Minimum size of packet in forward direction 
Fwd Packet Length Max Maximum size of packet in forward direction 
Fwd Packet Length Mean Mean size of packet in forward direction 
Fwd Packet Length Std Standard deviation size of packet in forward direction 
Bwd Packet Length Min Minimum size of packet in backward direction 
Bwd Packet Length Max Maximum size of packet in backward direction 
Bwd Packet Length Mean Mean size of packet in backward direction 
Bwd Packet Length Std Standard deviation size of packet in backward 
direction 
Flow Bytes/s Number of flow bytes per second 
Flow Packets/s Number of flow packets per second 
Flow IAT Mean Mean time between two packets sent in the flow 
Flow IAT Std Standard deviation time between two packets sent in 
the flow 
Flow IAT Max Maximum time between two packets sent in the flow 
Flow IAT Min Minimum time between two packets sent in the flow 
Fwd IAT Min Minimum time between two packets sent in the 
forward direction 
Fwd IAT Max Maximum time between two packets sent in the 
forward direction 
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Feature Name Description 
Fwd IAT Mean Mean time between two packets sent in the forward 
direction 
Fwd IAT Std Standard deviation time between two packets sent in 
the forward direction 
Fwd IAT Total Total time between two packets sent in the forward 
direction 
Bwd IAT Min Minimum time between two packets sent in the 
backward direction 
Bwd IAT Max Maximum time between two packets sent in the 
backward direction 
Bwd IAT Mean Mean time between two packets sent in the backward 
direction 
Bwd IAT Std Standard deviation time between two packets sent in 
the backward direction 
Bwd IAT Total Total time between two packets sent in the backward 
direction 
Fwd PSH flags Number of times the PSH flag was set in packets 
travelling in the forward direction 
Bwd PSH Flags Number of times the PSH flag was set in packets 
travelling in the backward direction 
Fwd URG Flags Number of times the URG flag was set in packets 
travelling in the forward direction 
Bwd URG Flags Number of times the URG flag was set in packets 
travelling in the backward direction 
Fwd Header Length Total bytes used for headers in the forward direction 
Bwd Header Length Total bytes used for headers in the backward direction 
FWD Packets/s Number of forward packets per second 
Bwd Packets/s Number of backward packets per second 
Packet Length Min Minimum length of a packet 
Packet Length Max Maximum length of a packet 
Packet Length Mean Mean length of a packet 
Packet Length Std Standard deviation length of a packet 
Packet Length Variance Variance length of a packet 
FIN Flag Count Number of packets with FIN 
SYN Flag Count Number of packets with SYN 
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Feature Name Description 
RST Flag Count Number of packets with FRST 
PSH Flag Count Number of packets with PUSH 
ACK Flag Count Number of packets with ACK 
URG Flag Count Number of packets with URG 
CWR Flag Count Number of packets with CWR 
ECE Flag Count Number of packets with ECE 
down/Up Ratio Download and upload ratio 
Average Packet Size Average size of packet 
Fwd Segment Size Avg Average size observed in the forward direction 
Bwd Segment Size Avg Average size observed in the backward direction 
Fwd Bytes/Bulk Avg Average number of bytes bulk rate in the forward 
direction 
Fwd Packet/Bulk Avg Average number of packets bulk rate in the forward 
direction 
Fwd Bulk Rate Avg Average number of bulk rate in the forward direction 
Bwd Bytes/Bulk Avg Average number of bytes bulk rate in the backward 
direction 
Bwd Packet/Bulk Avg Average number of packets bulk rate in the backward 
direction 
Bwd Bulk Rate Avg Average number of bulk rate in the backward direction 
Subflow Fwd Packets The average number of packets in a sub flow in the 
forward direction 
Subflow Fwd Bytes The average number of bytes in a sub flow in the 
forward direction 
Subflow Bwd Packets The average number of packets in a sub flow in the 
backward direction 
Subflow Bwd Bytes The average number of bytes in a sub flow in the 
backward direction 
Fwd Init Win bytes The total number of bytes sent in initial window in the 
forward direction 
Bwd Init Win bytes The total number of bytes sent in initial window in the 
backward direction 
Fwd Act Data Pkts Count of packets with at least 1 byte of TCP data 
payload in the forward direction 
Fwd Seg Size Min Minimum segment size observed in the forward 
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Feature Name Description 
direction 
Active Min Minimum time a flow was active before becoming idle 
Active Mean Mean time a flow was active before becoming idle 
Active Max Maximum time a flow was active before becoming idle 
Active Std Standard deviation time a flow was active before 
becoming idle 
Idle Min Minimum time a flow was idle before becoming active 
Idle Mean Mean time a flow was idle before becoming active 
Idle Max Maximum time a flow was idle before becoming active 
Idle Std Standard deviation time a flow was idle before 
becoming active 
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APPENDIX B. CONVERSION OF PCAP FILE TO FLOW BASED 
CSV FILE USING CICFLOWMETER 
This appendix aims to provide a guide to use the CICFlowmeter. 
Step 1. Download the CICFlowmeter from the official website by Canadian 
Institute of Cybersecurity. Unzip the file to “c” drive. 
Step 2. Run the “CICFlowMeter.bat” found in “c:\CICFlowmeter\bin” folder. The 
following program will be loaded. You will need to have a Java Development Kit (JDK) 
installed to load the program. See Figure 20 below. 
  
 
Step 3. Select “Offline” from the “NetWork” dropdown list to convert PCAP file 




Step 4. In the “Pcap dir,” select the PCAP file to convert. In the “Output dir,” select 
the location of the file to save to after conversion. Click on “OK” to convert. 
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APPENDIX C. USING THE MATLAB CLASSIFICATION LEARNER 
APP 
This appendix aims to provide a guide to use the MATLAB classification learner 
app. The figures are provided using version 2020b. 
Step 1. Click on the “Classification Learner” from the “APPS” tab. 
 
 
Step 2. Next, click the “New Session” and select “From File.” 
 
 
Step 3. Choose the CSV file that is generated from the CICFlowmeter and click 
“Import Selection.” 
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Step 4. Select “holdout validation” and set to 25%. Click on “Start Session.” 
 
 
Step 5. From the algorithm selection drop down box, select “Weighted KNN,” 




Step 6. Once training is completed, run the following code to check for the results. 








Bayesian_accuracy = sum(iscorrect1)*100/3186 
 
%% KNN 




KNN_accuracy = sum(iscorrect2)*100/3186 
 
%% Random Forest 




RandomForest_accuracy = sum(iscorrect3)*100/3186 
  
52 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
53 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
[1]  J. A. Momoh, Energy Processing and Smart Grid, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 2018.  
 
[2]   U.S. Department of Energy, “The Smart Grid,” [Online]. Available: 
https://www.smartgrid.gov/the_smart_grid/smart_grid.html. [Accessed 01 Jul 
2021]. 
  
[3]  “Navy and Marine Corps Smart Grid CDD Industry Version,” NAVFAC, 
Washington, DC, USA, 2014. 
 
[4]  U.S. Navy Public Affairs, “NAVFAC Reaches Key Milestone in Deploying New 
Smart Energy Monitoring and Control Solution,” 30 Apr 2019. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=109430#. [Accessed 01 Jul 
2021]. 
 
[5]  National Institure of Standards and Technology, “Guide to Industrial Control 
Systems (ICS) Security,” May 2015. [Online]. Available: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-82r2. [Accessed 01 Jul 2021]. 
 
[6]  N. Falliere, L. O. Murchu and E. Chien, “W32.Stuxnet Dossier,” Symantec Security 
Response, 2010. 
 
[7]  N. Stinchcombe, “Cloud Computing in the Spotlight,” in Infosecurity, 2009, pp. 
30–33. 
 
[8]  V. Chan, “Using a K-Nearest Neighbors Machine Learning Approach to Detect 
Cyberattacks on the Navy Smart Grid,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, 2020. 
 
[9]  C. A. Schiesser, “Malicious Threat Detection for NAVFAC Based Smart Grid 
Network Using Bayesian Classification and Machine Learning,” Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2020. 
 
[10]  A. Lemay and J. Fernandez, “Providing SCADA network data sets for intrusion 
detection research,” 2016. 
 
[11]  M. ÅKERMAN, “Implementing Shop Floor IT for Industry 4.0,” Chalmers 
University of Technology, Sweden, 2018. 
 
[12]  K. Stouffer, J. Falco and K. Kent, “Guide to Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems Security,” National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, 2006. 
54 
[13]  MODICON Inc., “Modicon Modbus Protocol Reference Guide,” Jun 1996. 
[Online]. Available: https://modbus.org/docs/PI_MBUS_300.pdf. [Accessed 01 Jul 
2021]. 
 
[14]  B. Drury, Control Techniques Drives and Controls Handbook (2nd edition), 
Institution of Engineering and Technology, 2009.  
 
[15]  S. D. Anton, S. Kanoor, D. Fraunholz and H. D. Schotten, “Evaluation of Machine 
Learning-based Anomaly Detection Algorithms on an Industrial Modbus/TCP Data 
Set,” German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence, Kaiserslautern, Germany, 
2019. 
 
[16]  Control, “Introduction to Modbus,” 2021. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.controlglobal.com/articles/2019/introduction-to-modbus/. [Accessed 
03 Jul 2021]. 
 
[17]  M. A. Teixeira, T. Salman, M. Zolanvari, R. Jain, N. Meskin and M. Samaka, 
“SCADA System Testbed for Cybersecurity Research Using Machine Learning 
Approach,” Basel, Switzerland, 2018. 
 
[18]  L. Rosa, T. Cruz, P. Simoes, E. Monteiro and L. Lev, “Attacking SCADA systems: 
a practical perspective,” in FIP/IEEE International Symposium on Integrated 
Network Management, Lisbon, Portugal, 2017.  
 
[19]  P. Angelo and A. C. Drummond, “A Survey of Random Forest Based Methods for 
Intrusion Detection Systems,” ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 1–36, 
2018.  
 
[20]   H. Chauhan, V. Kumar, S. Pundir and E. Pilli, “A Comparative Study of 
Classification Techniques for Intrusion Detection,” in International Symposium 
on Computational and Business Intelligence, 2013.  
 
[21]  M. Belavagi and B. Muniyal, “Performance evaluation of supervised machine 
learning algorithms for Intrusion Detection,” in Twelfth International Multi-
Conference on Information Processing, 2016.  
 
[22]   N. Ashraf, W. Ahmad and R. Ashraf, “A Comparative Study of Data Mining 
Algorithms for High Detection Rate in Intrusion Detection System,” Annals of 
Emerging Technologies in Computing (AETiC), vol. 2, no. 1, 2018.  
 
[23]  MathWorks, Inc., “Machine Learning in MATLAB,” [Online]. Available: 
https://www.mathworks.com/help/stats/machine-learning-in-matlab.html. 
[Accessed 04 Jul 2021]. 
 
55 
[24]   IBM, “Unsupervised Learning,” 21 Sep 2020. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/unsupervised-learning. [Accessed 06 Jul 2021]. 
  
[25]  R. Duda and P. Hart, “Nearest neighbor pater classification,” IEEE Trans. Inf. 
Theory, vol. 13, pp. 21–27, 1967.  
 
[26]  S. Sun and R. Huang, “An Adaptive k-Nearest Neighbor Algorithm,” in 2010 
Seventh International Conference on Fuzzy Systems and Knowledge Discovery, 
Shanghai, China, 2010.  
 
[27]  I. Jose, “KNN (K-Nearest Neighbors) #1,” 8 Nov 2018. [Online]. Available: 
https://towardsdatascience.com/knn-k-nearest-neighbors-1-a4707b24bd1d. 
[Accessed 05 Jul 2021]. 
 
[28]  K. R. Chowdhary, “Statistical Learning Theory,” in Fundamentals of Artificial 
Intelligence, Springer, 2020, p. 428. 
 
[29]  N. B. Amor, S. Benferhat and Z. Elouedi, “Naive Bayes vs Decision Trees in 
Intrusion Detection Systems,” in ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, 
Nicosia, Cyprus, 2004.  
 
[30]  F. V. Jensen, “Introduction to Bayesian Networks,” UCL Press, 1996. 
 
[31]  L. Breiman, “Random Forests,” Machine Learning, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 5–32, 2001.  
 
[32]  O. Mbaabu, “Introduction to Random Forest in Machine Learning,” 11 Dec 2020. 
[Online]. Available: https://www.section.io/engineering-education/introduction-
to-random-forest-in-machine-learning/. [Accessed 01 Jul 2021]. 
 
[33]  A. Swales, “Open Modbus/TCP Specification,” 29 Mar 1999. [Online]. Available: 
https://wingpath.co.uk/docs/modbus_tcp_specification.pdf. [Accessed 02 Jul 
2021]. 
 
[34]  Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity, “CICFlowMeter,” 2017. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.unb.ca/cic/research/applications.html#CICFlowMeter. [Accessed 03 
Jul 2021]. 
 
[35]   G. Vasquez, R. Miani and B. Zarpelao, “Flow-Based Intrusion Detection for 
SCADA networks using Supervised Learning,” 2017. 
 
[36]  T. Morris and W. Gao, “Industrial Control System Traffic Data Sets for Intrusion 
Detection Research,” in Critical Infrastructure Protection VIII, Berlin, IFIP 
Advances in Information and Communication Technology, 2014, pp. 65–78. 
 
56 
[37]  B. W. Matthews, “Comparison of the predicted and observed secondary structure 
of T4 phage lysozyme,” Biochimica et Biophysica Acta (BBA) - Protein Structure, 
vol. 405, no. 2, pp. 442–451, 20 Oct 1975.  
 
[38]  B. Shmueli, “Matthews Correlation Coefficient is The Best Classification Metric 
You’ve Never Heard Of,” 22 Nov 2019. [Online]. Available: 
https://towardsdatascience.com/the-best-classification-metric-youve-never-heard-
of-the-matthews-correlation-coefficient-3bf50a2f3e9a. [Accessed 01 Aug 2021]. 
 
[39]   A. H. Lashkari, “CICFlowMeter/ReadMe.txt,” 07 Jun 2021. [Online]. Available: 
https://github.com/ahlashkari/CICFlowMeter/blob/master/ReadMe.txt. [Accessed 
10 Jul 2021]. 
 
57 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
